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DISCIPLINE OF SPECIAL-EDUCATION
STUDENTS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Ed.D*
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act.' The Act was passed based on findings that the spe-
cial-education needs of over half of the children in the United
States with disabilities were not being fully met.2 Specifically, Con-
gress found that one million children with disabilities were entirely
excluded from the public school system while others were allowed
to participate but did not realize the full benefits of an education
because their disabilities went undetected. Thus, by mandating a
Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE")4 for all students
with disabilities5 in the Least Restrictive Environment ("LRE") 6
possible, Congress effectively required schools to fully incorporate
students with disabilities into the public education system. The
landmark legislation also gave students with disabilities and their
parents unprecedented due process rights.7 The law included a re-
quirement that school officials and parents jointly design an Indi-
* Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Ed.D., Boston College, M.Ed., Fitchburg State College,
is the principal of the Snug Harbor Community School in Quincy, Massachusetts. Dr.
Osborne is also the president elect of the Education Law Association.
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1977)).
2. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2001).
3. See id.
4. See id. §1401(8). FAPE is special-education and services at the preschool, ele-
mentary, and secondary school levels that have been paid for and are supervised by
the state or local government. Id. Additionally, FAPE must meet the standards of the
state educational agency. Id.
5. Id. § 1401(3) (defining a child with a disability as "a child with mental retarda-
tion, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, vis-
ual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities").
6. See id. § 1412(a)(5). Education in the LRE means that, where appropriate and
to the maximum extent possible, children with disabilities are educated with children
who are not disabled. Id.
7. Id. § 1415(b). In addition to traditional due process rights such as the right to
confront and cross examine witnesses, the legislation allows parents to view their
child's educational records; provides protections for children without parents; re-
quires written notice to parents when a state agency proposes or refuses a change; and
affords parents with the opportunity to present complaints. Id.
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vidualized Education Program ("IEP")8 for each student requiring
special-education. 9 Since 1975, Congress has amended the statute
several times. One of those amendments, enacted in 1990, gave the
law a new name: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA").10
Prior to the enactment of the IDEA, some students with disabili-
ties were being totally excluded from the public schools, while
others were not able to succeed in their educational programs."
The purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that students with disabili-
ties have access to an appropriate education.12 The IDEA includes
a number of provisions to ensure that the rights of students with
disabilities are protected. For example, a student's educational
placement may not be arbitrarily changed by school officials.
Rather, the IDEA specifies that a change in educational placement
may occur only after the child's parents have been provided with
written notice of the contemplated change.1 3 If the parents object
to the proposed change in placement, they may request a due pro-
cess hearing. Depending on the state law, the due process hearing
may be conducted by either the state or local education agency. 14
8. Id. § 1414(d) (outlining the requirements for an IEP). An IEP must include a
statement of the student's current levels of educational performance; measurable an-
nual goals and short-term objectives; a statement of the special-education and related
services or program modifications the student is to receive; an explanation of the ex-
tent to which the student will participate in regular classroom activities; a statement
concerning modifications required for any state or district-wide assessments; the dates
covered by the IEP; and the criteria by which progress toward annual goals will be
measured. Id. In addition, when a student turns fourteen, the IEP must include a
statement of the transition services needed by the child. Id. Transition services are a
set of coordinated activities for a student with disabilities designed to ensure the suc-
cessful transition from school to post-school activities (such as vocational training
and/or employment). Id. §1401(30).
9. See id. § 1401(25) (defining special-education as special instruction provided at
no cost to the student's parents which is designed to meet the student's unique needs).
Special-education programs include instructional strategies specifically designed for
students with disabilities. Depending on the nature and severity of the student's disa-
bility, a special-education program may range from a modified regular education
classroom to a residential school program. Special-education programs typically
found in a public school include resource rooms where students receive specialized
instruction for only a portion of the school day and self-contained classrooms, where
students receive all of their instruction in a special-education environment.
10. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104
Stat. 1141) (as codified at 20 U.S.C. §1400-1487 (1994)).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(s) (2001). See also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972) (finding that 18,000 out of 22,000 disabled students in the school dis-
trict were not being furnished with programs of specialized education).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3) (2001).
13. Id. § 1415(b)(3).
14. Id. § 1415(f).
DISCIPLINE UNDER IDEA
The hearing must be presided over by an impartial hearing officer
who is not an employee of the state or local education agency.15 If
the hearing is held at the local level, the losing party may appeal to
a state level hearing. 16 Eventually, unfavorable hearing decisions
may be appealed to the state or federal courts.17
As indicated above, a student with disabilities must be educated
in the LRE. For most students the LRE is the regular classroom
and they are removed from the class only to the extent necessary to
receive needed special-education services. Some students, how-
ever, may require a more restrictive placement. This could include
a substantially separate special-education classroom in a public
school, or a placement in a private day school, or a residential
school.
The law, as initially enacted and amended, was silent on the sub-
ject of discipline. Many of its provisions, however, had implica-
tions for a school's efforts to discipline students with disabilities.1
Since penalties like expulsion or long-term suspension would de-
prive a student of educational opportunity, courts found such disci-
pline to deprive students of their due process rights guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 In 1997, Congress passed the
most comprehensive amendments to the IDEA to date.z0 The
amendments included provisions on the discipline of students with
15. 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1999).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2001).
17. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
18. See, e.g., id. § 1415(b)(3)(A) (requiring prior written notice whenever a school
district proposes to change a student's placement; some disciplinary sanctions can be
considered a change in placement).
19. ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., LEGAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL-EDUCATION 159-60
(1995). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 565-66 (1975) (holding students may be
suspended or expelled from school as long as they are afforded certain due process
safeguards). The Court in Goss held that the Fourteenth amendment entitles students
to a public education as a property interest that may not be taken away for miscon-
duct without observing minimum procedures. Id. at 565. The Court went on to say
the State cannot determine unilaterally whether the misconduct has occurred and a
ten-day (or less) suspension from school cannot be imposed without adherence to due
process rights. Id. at 565-66. Specifically, a student must be given (a) written or oral
notice of the charges; (b) an explanation of the evidence in support of those charges;
and (c) an opportunity to present his or her version of the incident or conduct. Id. at
566. As interpreted by the courts, the IDEA gives special-education students more
due process when faced with a possible expulsion. For example, school officials must
determine if the student's misbehavior is a manifestation of the student's disability.
See infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text.
20. Individuals with Disabilities Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
§ 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1413 (1997)).
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disabilities.21 Many of those provisions simply codified existing
case law; others, however, helped clarify formerly opaque areas.22
This article will analyze the requirements for disciplining a stu-
dent with disabilities. It begins with a historical overview of the
case law prior to the 1997 amendments to the IDEA.23 This review
will help the reader understand why many of IDEA's current disci-
plinary provisions developed. Next, the article will review the spe-
cific requirements of the 1997 amendments and post-amendment
case law.24 The article concludes with some practical recommenda-
tions for educators.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CASE LAW
As indicated above, the IDEA did not initially contain any pro-
visions directly addressing discipline. Courts, however, were fre-
quently asked to settle disputes arising out of disciplinary actions.
A large body of case law developed from these lawsuits.2 6
A. Early Lower Court Decisions
The first court case decided under the IDEA involved discipline.
In Stuart v. Nappi,27 the public school district in Danbury, Connect-
icut tried to expel a third-year student with a complex learning dis-
ability who had been involved in several school-wide disturbances
and had a history of behavioral problems.28 The student's attorney
21. Id. See also Assistance to the States for the Education of Children with Disa-
bilities and the Early Intervention Program for Toddlers and Infants With Disabilities
of 1999, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.19 (2001) (issuing new IDEA regulations).
22. ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., DISCIPLINARY OPTIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISA-
BILITIES, addendum 1 (1997).
23. See infra notes 26-157 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 158-214 and accompanying text.
25. Although beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that students
with disabilities also have rights under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2001)
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2001). See gen-
erally PERRY A. ZIRKEL & STEVEN R. ALEMAN, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE
SCHOOLS (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing Section 504 and the ADA requirements and pro-
viding commentary on court decisions and administrative rulings).
26. See generally STEPHEN B. THOMAS & CHARLES J. Russo, SPECIAL-EDUCA-
TION LAW: ISSUES & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE '90s (1995) (providing a comprehensive
overview of the case law that developed early in the history of the IDEA).
27. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978). Three years later, in an
unpublished opinion, the same court handed down a similar decision in a case that
was procedurally identical to Stuart. See Blue v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., No. N-81-
41, slip. op. (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 1981) (reiterating the principle that the IDEA could
not be circumvented by disciplinary procedures).
28. Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1237-39.
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requested a due process hearing under the IDEA. 9 The attorney
also obtained a temporary restraining order from a federal district
court enjoining the school board from conducting a hearing to ex-
pel the student.3 ° The court held that an expulsion was a change in
placement inconsistent with the IDEA's procedures.31 The court
did rule, however, that school officials could temporarily suspend a
disruptive special-education student32 or change the student's
placement to a more restrictive one by following the Act's given
procedures.33
In Doe v. Koger,34 a federal district court in Indiana overturned
the Board of Education of the City of Mishawaka's expulsion of a
mildly mentally disabled student. The court stated that schools
could not expel disabled students whose disruptive conduct is
caused by their disability.35 This rule became known as the mani-
festation-of-the-disability doctrine.36 The doctrine implies, of
course, that schools can expel a disabled student if the student's
misconduct is not related to the student's disability. The court also
ruled that schools could transfer a disruptive special-education stu-
29. Id. at 1239. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2001) (defining due process rights
under the IDEA).
30. Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1237-39.
31. Id. at 1241- 43. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2001) (providing that prior written
notice must be given to the student's parents if the school district proposes to change
the student's educational placement); id. § 14150) (stating that if the parents object to
the change in placement and request a due process hearing, the school district is pro-
hibited from making that change until the proceedings are completed).
32. Stuart, 443 F. Supp at 1243. See Bd. of Educ. v. I11. State Bd. of Educ., 531 F.
Supp. 148, 151 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (upholding an Illinois public school district's five day
suspension of a special-education student and stating that a brief period of forced
absence, such as a five-day suspension, could not reasonably be considered a change
in placement). See also Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a three-day in-house suspension, even when the student was denied ac-
cess to his special-education teacher and resources, did not violate the student's sub-
stantive due process rights under the IDEA).
33. Stuart, 443 F. Supp. at 1243.
34. Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
35. Id. at 229. See also Howard v. Friendswood Ind. Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634,
640- 41. (S.D. Tex. 1978) (granting a preliminary injunction where a student with brain
damage and anxiety problems was suspended because he was repeatedly found wan-
dering the halls and skipping school. The court found the school district improperly
treated the incidents as disciplinary problems and not as a result of diagnosed handi-
caps and that the school district had violated the due process rights of the student
when it expelled him without a fair hearing).
36. See generally Allan G. Osborne, Making the Manifestation Determination
When Disciplining a Special-education Student, 119 ED. L. REP. 323, 323-30 (1997)
(explaining the formulation of the doctrine in Koger and clarifying what manifestation
means in addition to when and by whom the manifestation determination must be
made).
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dent to a more restrictive placement as long as proper change in
placement procedures were followed under the IDEA.37 Seven
years later, another federal court in Indiana ruled that a school's
use of moderate corporal punishment, as allowed by state law, did
not infringe on the rights of a student with an emotional handi-
cap.38 The court noted that the school gave the student the same
punishment it would have given any other pupil engaging in similar
conduct.
39
In S-1 v. Turlington,40 decided in 1981, the Fifth Circuit extended
the manifestation of the disability doctrine. Seven mentally re-
tarded41 high school students had been expelled for a variety of
acts of misconduct. 42 One student requested a manifestation hear-
ing to determine if the student's behavior was related to his disabil-
ity.43 The school superintendent determined that since the student
was not classified as emotionally disturbed, the misconduct was not
a manifestation of his disability.44 In overturning the expulsion, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that the manifestation decision must be made by
a specialized and knowledgeable group of persons.45 If such a
group found no relationship between the student's misconduct and
disability,46 and the school expelled the student in accordance with
37. Koger, 480 F. Supp at 228. See Victoria v. Dist. Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369, 369-74
(11th Cir. 1984) (upholding a Florida public school district's transfer of a student, who
had brought weapons to school and threatened another student, to an alternative
school over the objections of her parents), abrogated by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305
(1988).
38. Cole v. Greenfield-Cent. Cmty. Schs., 657 F. Supp. 56, 58 (S.D. Ind. 1986). The
student had been diagnosed with hyperactivity and was otherwise emotionally dis-
turbed. The student had, among other incidents, kicked other students; spit on stu-
dents; forged his father's signature; knocked other students down; and disrupted the
classroom and lunchroom. Id. at 58. The alleged punishments used by the school
included paddling; sitting the student at an isolated desk in the classroom or in an-
other classroom altogether; preventing the student from attending a field-trip; taping
the student's mouth shut; and, on one occasion, denying the student's request to visit
the school nurse. Id.
39. Id. at 58-59.
40. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Turlington v. S-1,
454 U.S. 1030 (1981), abrogated by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
41. Each expelled student had been classified as either educable mentally retarded
(EMR), mildly mentally retarded, or EMR/dull normal. S-1, 635 F.2d at 344.
42. The acts of misconduct included masturbating, sexual acts against another stu-
dent, insubordination, vandalism, and use of bad language. Id. at 344 n.1.
43. Id. at 344.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 347-48. See also Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 600-02 (6th Cir. 1982)
(adopting the analysis put forth in S-1 and overturning a ninth grade "handicapped or
exceptional" student's expulsion where the student had destroyed school property
and acted physically violent towards a teacher).
46. S-1, 635 F.2d at 347-48.
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the IDEA's procedures, 4 expulsion was permissible but there still
could not be a complete cessation of services.48
A 1985 Fourth Circuit decision illustrated that courts would
sometimes stretch to tie a student's misconduct to the student's dis-
ability. In School Board v. Malone,49 a fourteen-year-old male stu-
dent with a language-related learning disability took part in several
drug deals. 50 A committee of special-education professionals met
and decided that the youth's disability did not cause him to partici-
pate in the drug deals.51 The school subsequently expelled the stu-
dent.52 A district court, however, found that the disability was,
indeed, responsible for the youth's behavior.53 The court found
that the student's learning disability resulted in poor self-esteem
leading him to seek peer approval by partaking in drug deals.54
Furthermore, the court found that the boy's learning disability pre-
vented him from understanding the long-term consequences of his
actions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.56
Courts did permit schools to exclude students who posed a dan-
ger to others as long as the IDEA's due process procedures were
followed. In Jackson v. Franklin County School Board,7 the Fifth
Circuit upheld a Mississippi school district's exclusion of a seven-
teen-year-old student diagnosed with a psycho-sexual disorder.58
A youth court had committed the student to a state hospital for
treatment.59 When he tried to return to school upon release from
the hospital, school officials refused to admit him and instead of-
fered to pay for an alternative placement.6 ° The court upheld the
47. Id.
48. Id. at 348 (citing Sherry v. N.Y. State Educ. Dept., 479 F. Supp. 1328
(W.D.N.Y. 1979)) (holding an indefinite suspension is a change of educational place-
ment, invoking the procedural protections of the EHA where a legally blind and deaf
student suffering from brain damage and an emotional disorder which made her self-
abusive was suspended because there was insufficient staff to care for her).
49. Sch. Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 1212.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1213.
54. Id. at 1216-17.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1219.
57. Jackson v. Franklin Sch. Bd, 765 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
58. Jackson, 765 F.2d at 536.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 537. The school district offered to pay for the following alternatives:
home tutoring, vocational or job training, and semi-structured group or foster homes.
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school's right to exclude a student it determined to be dangerous.61
Almost two years later, however, the Fifth Circuit admonished
school authorities for failing to convene a conference when the stu-
dent was released from the hospital as required under the EHA.62
B. U.S. Supreme Court Decision
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court gave its first ruling on a case
involving the discipline of a student with disabilities. Honig v. Doe
63 involved two special-education students, sixteen-year-old John
Doe and twelve-year-old Jack Smith.64 Doe was an emotionally
disturbed student in San Francisco who had difficulty controlling
his "impulses and anger. ' 65 Under his IEP, he attended a develop-
mental center for disabled students.66 Shortly after being placed in
the center, he assaulted another student and broke a school win-
dow. 67 The center suspended the student for five days and referred
the matter to the school district's Student Placement Committee
("SPC"), which, in turn, indefinitely suspended him pending an ex-
pulsion hearing. 68 Doe's counsel requested that the expulsion
hearing be canceled and the IEP team convened.69 When these
efforts were unsuccessful, Doe sued various school officials and the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction.70 The school eventu-
ally canceled the expulsion hearing, and the district court issued a
temporary restraining order readmitting Doe to school.71 The
court later issued a preliminary injunction preventing the school
from excluding Doe while an alternative placement was being
found.72
Id. The student's mother refused any placement outside of the Franklin County public
school system. Id.
61. Id.
62. Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the failure to convene a conference at that time was a per se violation of
the EHA).
63. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), aff'g sub nom. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470
(9th Cir. 1986).
64. Honig, 484 U.S. at 312, 314.
65. Id. at 312.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 313-14.
71. Id. at 314.
72. Id. at 316.
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Smith was also emotionally disturbed with aggressive tenden-
cies.73 Smith's IEP put him in a special-education program in a
regular school on a trial basis."4 Following a number of incidents of
misconduct (including stealing, extorting money from other stu-
dents, and making sexual comments) the school reduced his pro-
gram to a half-day schedule.75 Although his grandparents agreed
to this reduction, the school did not advise them of their rights or
options regarding his IEP.76 The school later suspended Smith for
five days and recommended his expulsion after he made sexual
comments to female students." Smith's suspension was continued
by the SPC pending resolution of expulsion proceedings.78 When
Smith's attorney objected to the expulsion hearing, the SPC can-
celed it and offered to either restore the half-day program or pro-
vide home tutoring.79 His grandparents chose home tutoring.80
The district court later held that a reduction in schedule without
first convening the IEP team violated the IDEA.81
The district court held and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that a
school could not expel a student with disabilities for behavior unre-
lated to the student's disabilities.82 In Honig, the Supreme Court
affirmed this holding.83 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan
stated that in passing the IDEA, Congress intended to limit school
officials' ability to exclude students with disabilities, even for disci-
plinary purposes:
We think it clear, however, that Congress very much meant to
strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally
employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally
disturbed students, from school. In so doing, Congress did not
leave school administrators powerless to deal with dangerous
students; it did, however, deny school officials their former right
to "self help," and directed that in the future the removal of
73. Smith's school records showed that he could not control his "verbal or physical
outbursts." Id. at 314.







81. Id. at 316.
82. Id. at 305 (citing Doe v. Maher, 793 F. 2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986)).
83. Id. at 329.
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disabled students could be accomplished only with the permis-
sion of the parents or, as a last resort, the courts.84
The Court's ruling left school officials with some recourse.
School officials could temporarily suspend a disabled student for
up to ten days if the student posed an immediate threat to the
safety of others.85 During the ten-day "cooling off" period, the
Court hoped school officials would reach an agreement with the
parents for an interim placement.86 However, if the parents ada-
mantly refused to a change in placement, the Court ruled that
school officials could seek the aid of the courts by filing a
§ 1415(e)(2) suit for an injunction. 7 In such circumstances, school
officials would not be required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies 88 before filing a court action if they could show administrative
review would be futile or inadequate.89 The majority opinion went
on to state that in appropriate cases the courts could temporarily
enjoin a dangerous child from attending school. 90 The Court sum-
marized by stating that the IDEA created a presumption in favor
of a student's current educational placement and that school offi-
cials could overcome that presumption only by showing that main-
taining the status quo was substantially likely to result in injury to
that child or other students.9'
C. Post-Honig Lower Court Decisions
Although the Supreme Court decision in Honig clarified many
issues regarding the discipline of special-education students, the lit-
igation did not come to a halt.92 The Honig decision made it clear
that students with disabilities could not be expelled for behavior
related to their disabilities.93 However, the court also indicated
that other normal disciplinary sanctions, like a short-term suspen-
sion of up to ten days, could be used as long as they did not involve
a change of placement.94
84. Id. at 323-324.
85. Id. at 325.
86. Id. at 326.
87. Id.
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2001) (stating that parties to a special-education dispute
must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit in the courts).
89. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 328.
92. Id. at 329.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 325 n.8.
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Approximately one year after the Honig opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed that short-term disciplinary measures did not consti-
tute a change in placement under the IDEA.95 In Hayes v. Unified
School District,96 the parents of two students, a male and female
with histories of academic and behavior problems objected to the
use of in-school suspensions and time-out.97 Although the court
found that the short-term measures did not amount to a change in
placement, it held that such measures related to the students edu-
cation, and thus were subject to the IDEA's administrative due
process procedures. 98 Similarly, a district court in North Carolina,
citing Honig, held that a ten-day suspension did not violate the
IDEA's stay-put provision.99
In allowing suspensions of up to ten school days, the Supreme
Court in Honig envisioned a "cooling off" period allowing school
officials and parents to work together to devise another placement
for the student if necessary.' Unfortunately, school officials and
parents do not always agree, and an alternative placement cannot
always be worked out in ten days. If an agreement cannot be
reached, the dispute would formerly have been subject to the often
lengthy administrative and judicial process. 1°1 The Honig decision
gave school officials the ability to seek a court injunction to remove
a student with disabilities who was either dangerous or seriously
disruptive of the educational process during the pendency of ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings. 2 The burden is on school
officials, however, to show the student is truly dangerous and that
removal from the current educational placement is the only feasi-
ble option.10 3
After Honig several lawsuits involved school district requests for
such injunctions. A Virginia state court granted an injunction
against a twelve-year-old boy who had fought with several stu-
95. Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1989).
96. Id.
97. Time-out is a common tool used in many special-education classrooms
whereby the student is placed in an isolated area (generally within the classroom)
until he or she can return to the larger group without disruption. Id. at 811 n.3.
98. Id. at 813.
99. Glen III v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 903 F. Supp. 918, 935
(W.D.N.C. 1995); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A) (2001) (defining "stay-put" to
mean that the child must remain in his or her current educational placement until all
proceedings have been completed unless both sides agree otherwise).
100. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326 (1988), affg sub nom. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d
1470 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. See supra notes 26-62 and accompanying text.
102. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 325.
103. Id.
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dents, struck and yelled obscenities at school officials, and required
police restraint on several occasions. 10 4 An Illinois federal district
court issued an injunction barring a student who violently struck
other students and threatened to kill students and staff.10 5 A New
York State court found that school officials met their burden of
showing that a student who ran out of the school waving an iron
bar while threatening to kill someone was likely to endanger other
students if he returned to school. 10 6
A federal district court in Missouri, however, refused to issue an
injunction against a student who threw furniture, repeatedly ex-
ploded in anger, and made threats to students and school offi-
cials.107 Even though another student had been injured in one of
these incidents and teachers testified they were afraid of the stu-
dent, the court held that these facts were not sufficient to establish
that serious personal injury would likely occur if the student re-
mained at school. 10 8 A district court in Pennsylvania likewise re-
fused to issue an injunction when school officials failed to show
they had taken every reasonable measure to mitigate the danger
posed by a student who had threatened another student with a box-
cutter.109
In other cases, courts not only issued injunctions to bar students
from attending school, but also ordered alternative placements. A
Texas district court issued an injunction preventing a student who
had used profanity, destroyed school property, and assaulted stu-
dents and teachers from attending general education classes.110
School officials had recommended that the student be placed in a
special-education behavior management class."' The parents had
rejected that option, but the court held that the student could ei-
ther attend the class or receive home tutoring pending completion
of the administrative review process." 2 Similarly, a New York dis-
104. Sch. Bd. v. Wills, 16 EHLR 1109 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1989). See also Sch. Bd. v. Far-
ley, 16 EHLR 1119 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 1990) (issuing an injunction against a student
who had set a fire in a school locker among other infractions).
105. Bd. of Educ. v. Kurtz-Imig, 16 EHLR 17 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
106. East Islip Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Andersen, 615 N.Y.S.2d 852, 852, 854 (Sup.
Ct. 1994).
107. Clinton County R-I1 Sch. Dist. v. C.J.K., 896 F. Supp. 948, 950, 952 (W.D.
Mo. 1995).
108. Id. at 950-51.
109. Sch. Dist. v. Stephan, No. 97-1154, 1997 WL 89113 at *1, 3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27,
1997).
110. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jorstad, 752 F. Supp. 231, 233-39 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
111. Id. at 233.
112. Id. at 239.
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trict court issued an injunction to place a student in a special-edu-
cation class pending completion of a due process hearing.1 13 The
student had frequently exhibited aggressive behavior such as stick-
ing a pencil in another student's ear, throwing his shoes at staff,
tipping over desks, and throwing chairs. 14 A Florida district court
also granted a preliminary injunction allowing a school board to
transfer a student to a special-education center after he had been
involved in forty-three instances of aggressive physical, sexual, and
other inappropriate behavior. 1 5
In Light v. Parkway C-2 School District,1 6 the Eighth Circuit
provided excellent guidance on how to remove a student with disa-
bilities from school. The court held that a student with mental dis-
abilities who had exhibited a steady stream of aggressive and
disruptive behavior could be removed from her current special-ed-
ucation placement." 7 In so ruling, the court held that even a child
whose behaviors flowed directly from the disability was subject to
removal if she posed a substantial risk of injury to herself or
others." 8 However, the court found that in addition to showing
the student presented such a danger, school officials must also
show they made a reasonable effort to accommodate the student's
disabilities to minimize the likelihood that she would injure herself
or others.1" 9 The court emphasized that only a showing of the like-
lihood of injury was required; serious harm need not be inflicted
before a child could be deemed likely to cause injury. 120 Further-
more, the court ruled that injury is not defined solely as an inflic-
tion that draws blood or sends the victim to an emergency room
but also includes bruises, bites, and poked eyes.' 2'
Another issue that developed in the post-Honig era was whether
a student who had not yet been identified by school officials as
being disabled was entitled to IDEA protections if the student
claimed to be disabled. In Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dis-
trict v. Honig,12 2 the Ninth Circuit held that Honig indicated that all
disabled students, even if not previously identified as disabled, are
113. Binghampton City Sch. Dist. v. Borgna, 17 EHLR 677 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
1991).
114. Id.
115. Sch. Bd. v. J.M., 957 F. Supp. 1252, 1253-59 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
116. Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1994).
117. Id. at 1228.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1230.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992).
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entitled to the procedural protections of the IDEA.123 Similarly, in
M.P. v. Governing Board,124 a California federal district court held
that the procedural safeguards of the IDEA must be applied re-
gardless of whether a student has been previously diagnosed with a
disability.125 The court recognized that a non-disabled student
could attempt to be labeled disabled solely to gain the benefits of
the IDEA but stated that the Act did not address this possibility. 126
In Doe v. Manning, 27 however, a Virginia district court held that a
student who had been suspended for handling a loaded pistol on
school property was not entitled to the IDEA's protections be-
cause the question of her disability was raised well after the inci-
dent leading to her suspension. 128 A determining factor may be
whether school authorities knew or had reason to know that the
student was disabled. 29
A similar issue is whether a former special-education student,
who is not receiving services at the time of the disciplinary infrac-
tion, is entitled to IDEA protections. A federal district court in
Wisconsin indicated that such a student is entitled to IDEA protec-
tions, especially if the student was removed from special-education
at the request of a parent. In Steldt v. School Board,130 a student
who was removed from a special-education class at his mother's
request, but against the recommendation of his teacher, was ex-
pelled for a series of acts including assaults on the teacher, the
principal, and fellow students.131 The court held that the mother's
request for the student to be removed from special-education did
not change the student's status as a student in need of special-edu-
123. Id. at 491.
124. M.P. v. Governing Bd., 858 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
125. Id. at 1047-48.
126. Id. at 1047.'
127. Doe v. Manning, 4 A.D.D. 987, 1994 WL 99052 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 1994).
128. Id. at *1.
129. See, e.g., Davis v. Indep. Sch. Dist., Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Schs., 23
IDELR 644 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that a student who had been diagnosed as hav-
ing significant language delays by a private facility, but not by the school district, was
entitled to the IDEA's protections because the school district had a copy of the evalu-
ation report and thus, had reason to know that he required special-education); J.B. v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. 191, 21 IDELR 1157 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that a student who
had not been assessed as being disabled could assert the procedural protections of the
IDEA because evidence indicated that school officials were aware that the student
might have a disability. Part of that evidence was the fact that the student was flunk-
ing all of his courses).
130. Steldt v. Sch. Bd., 885 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
131. Id. at 1197.
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cation. 132 Thus, as a student with disabilities, he was entitled to the
IDEA protections.
A similar issue concerns the way schools should treat a student
evaluated by the school district but found not to be disabled. The
answer may be determined by the particular facts of the case. In
one such instance, where the school's staff concluded that the stu-
dent did not require special-education, but his mother had con-
tested that decision, the Seventh Circuit held the student was not
entitled to an injunction barring his expulsion while administrative
proceedings were pending.1 33 The court stated that in situations
such as this, a flexible approach to applying the IDEA's stay put
provision was needed and that the provision should not be auto-
matically applied to every student who filed an application for spe-
cial-education. 134
The Supreme Court in Honig stated that a special-education stu-
dent could be suspended for up to ten days. 35 However, the Court
did not indicate whether that ten-day limit was consecutive or cu-
mulative. In other words, if a student received a ten-day suspen-
sion could that student be suspended again later that same school
year? In Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District,13 6 the
Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's opinion did not sup-
port the argument that the ten-day limit referred to ten total
days.137 The court held that the school district's suspension guide-
lines, whereby each suspension triggered an evaluation to deter-
mine whether the student was receiving an appropriate education,
were lawful.' 38  However, in Manchester School District v.
Charles,'39 a New Hampshire federal district court held that cumu-
lative suspensions totaling more than ten days resulted in a pattern
of exclusion that constituted a change of placement.14 0
In the 1981 decision S-I v. Turlington,14a the Fifth Circuit held
that even when a school properly expels a special-education stu-
132. Id. at 1197.
133. Rodiriecus v. Waukegan Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 249, 250-55 (7th Cir. 1996).
134. Id. at 253.
135. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328-29 (1988), affg sub nom. Doe v. Maher, 793
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986).
136. Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994).
137. Id. at 1495.
138. Id. at 1496.
139. Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Charles, 6 A.D.D. 1103, 1994 WL 485754 (D.N.H.
Aug. 31, 1994).
140. Id. at *10.
141. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), abrogated by Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305 (1988).
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dent in accordance with the IDEA's due process procedures, the
school cannot completely cut off services.142 Under this ruling, a
school district would still have to provide special-education and re-
lated services to an expelled student with disabilities. This issue
arose again in 1992 when Virginia submitted its three year-plan for
special-education to the U.S. Department of Education.143 In-
cluded was a regulation stating that students with disabilities could
be disciplined in the same manner as non-disabled students if there
was no causal relationship between the misconduct and the disabil-
ity.144 The Department of Education responded by notifying Vir-
ginia that it could not discontinue educational services to expelled
special-education students, even if the discipline resulted from be-
havior unrelated to the students' disabilities.145 Virginia failed to
change the regulation and the dispute eventually ended up in the
courts.146 After much litigation, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that the IDEA did not require local school boards to disci-
pline disabled students if their misconduct was unrelated to their
disabilities.147 The Fourth Circuit held that the IDEA only re-
quired states to provide disabled students with access to a free ap-
propriate public education and, as with any right, that right of
access could be forfeited by conduct antithetical to the right it-
self. 148 Thus, the court ruled that school districts were not required
to provide educational services to disabled students who had for-
feited the right to a free appropriate education by willfully engag-
ing in conduct so serious as to warrant expulsion. 149
Several months later, the Seventh Circuit issued a similar ruling
in Doe v. Board of Education.5 ° In this case, a student had been
expelled for possessing a pipe and a small amount of marijuana.' 5'
The school district's evaluation team determined there was no
causal relationship between the student's disability and miscon-
duct. 152 The district court held that the school was not required to
provide alternative educational services during the expulsion pe-
142. Id. at 350.




147. Id. at 561.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 559.
150. Doe v. Bd. of Ed., 115 F.3d 1273, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1997).
151. Id. at 1275.
152. Id.
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riod.15 3 The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding the IDEA was not
intended to shield special-education students from the usual conse-
quences of misconduct when that misconduct was not related to
their disabilities. 154
The Fourth Circuit's Riley and the Seventh Circuit's Doe deci-
sions can be contrasted with an Arizona district court decision in
Magyar v. Tucson Unified School District155 where a learning dis-
abled fifteen-year-old student was expelled after giving a combat
knife to another student.1 56 In granting summary judgment for the
student, the court noted that the IDEA requires school districts to
provide an appropriate education for all students with disabili-
ties.1 57 The court held that the use of the word "all" in the IDEA
was clear and unequivocal and did not include an exception for
misbehaving students.1 58
II. THE 1997 IDEA AMENDMENTS
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of
1997 implemented the most far-reaching changes to the IDEA
since it was enacted in 1975.159 For the first time Congress included
specific provisions for disciplining students with disabilities. 60
Some of these provisions simply codified existing case law; others,
however, clarified previously gray areas, and settled disagreements
that had split the courts.16'
A. Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior
Intervention Plans
Several sections of the 1997 amendments require that school of-
ficials conduct a functional behavioral assessment and implement a
behavioral intervention plan or review such assessments and plans
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1280.
155. Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Ariz. 1997).
156. Id. at 1428.
157. Id. at 1438.
158. Id.
159. Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2001) with Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1487 (1977)). Congress amended the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in
1986, 1990, 1994, and 1997.
160. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (2001) (detailing the procedures to be followed
when disciplining a student with disabilities).
161. See, e.g., id. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (declaring that students with disabilities who have
been expelled are still entitled to a FAPE).
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if they are already in place. 162 Neither the IDEA nor its imple-
menting regulations, however, provide much guidance as to what
constitutes a functional behavioral assessment or a behavior inter-
vention plan.163 There have been no judicial decisions to date and
very few due process hearings dealing with either functional behav-
ioral assessment or behavior intervention plans. 164
B. Manifestation Doctrine
For the first time, the procedures required to conduct a manifes-
tation determination are now spelled out in the IDEA.165 The
IDEA states that this determination must be conducted by the IEP
team and other qualified personnel. 166 In making the manifesta-
tion determination, the team must consider evaluative, diagnostic,
and other relevant information (including information provided by
the parent or child), observations of the student, and the student's
IEP and placement. 167 In deciding whether the misconduct is a
manifestation of the disability, the team must determine if the stu-
dent's disability impaired his or her ability to understand the im-
pact and consequences of the misbehavior and if the disability
impaired the student's ability to control the behavior.168 If the
team determines that the misconduct is not a manifestation of the
disability, the student may be disciplined in the same manner as
non-disabled students, except that a free appropriate public educa-
tion may not be terminated.1 69 The team also must ascertain that
the student's IEP and placement were appropriate, and that all ser-
vices were provided in accordance with the IEP at the time of the
misconduct. 170 If there was any problem in this regard, the behav-
ior must be considered a manifestation of the student's disability. 171
162. See, e.g., id. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i).
163. See id. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (stating that "in the case of a child whose behavior
impedes his or her learning or that of others, consider, when appropriate, strategies,
including positive behavioral interventions, strategies, and supports to address that
behavior").
164. See generally Cynthia A. Dieterich & Christine J. Villani, Functional Behav-
ioral Assessment: Process Without Procedure, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 209 (2000)
(noting that most special-education practitioners are unaware that the Functional Be-
havioral Assessment is mandated under the 1997 amendments to the IDEA).
165. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4) (2001). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.523 (1999) (imple-
menting regulations).
166. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(B) (2001).
167. Id. § 1415(k)(4)(c)(i).
168. See id.
169. Id. § 1415(k)(5)(A). See also id. § 1412(a)(1).
170. 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c)(2)(i) (1999).
171. Id. § 300.523(d).
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If the student's parent disagrees with the team's manifestation de-
termination, the parent may request an expedited hearing. 172
C. Provision of Special-education Services During an Expulsion
The IDEA now makes clear that special-education services must
continue during an expulsion. 173 This provision is in line with the
position previously taken by the U.S. Department of Education 174
and effectively reverses the Fourth Circuit's decision in Virginia
Department of Education v. Riley. 175 This should end the contro-
versy that existed among the circuits. 76
D. Injunctions to Allow School Districts to. Exclude
Dangerous Students
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Honig, 77 school officials
have had the authority to seek injunctions from the courts to ex-
clude dangerous students with disabilities from the regular educa-
tion environment. School officials now have an additional option
as well. The 1997 amendments to the IDEA gave hearing officers
the authority to order a change in placement to an appropriate in-
terim alternative educational setting for up to forty-five days if
school officials can demonstrate that maintaining the student in his
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A)(i) (2001); 34 C.F.R. § 300.528 (1999) (outlining the
requirements for an expedited hearing).
173. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2001).
174. See Letter from Thomas Hehir, Director, Office of Specihl Education Pro-
grams, to Hartman (Oct. 19, 1995), reprinted in 23 IDELR 894 (1996); Letter from
Patricia J. Guard, Acting Director, Office of Special Education Programs, to JoAnne
Boggus, Teacher, Piper High School in Sunrise, Florida (Jul. 14, 1993), reprinted in 20
IDELR 625 (1994); Letter from William L. Smith, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office
of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, to Hon. David Price, House of Rep-
resentatives (Apr. 2, 1993), reprinted in 20 IDELR 1256 (1994); Letter from Judith E.
Heuman, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, to Hon. Charles H.
Taylor, House of Representatives (Sept. 23, 1993), reprinted in 20 IDELR 542 (1993);
Letter from Judy A. Schrag, Director, Office of Special Education Programs, to Uhler
(May 14, 1992), reprinted in 18 IDELR 1238 (1992); Letter from Dr. William C.
Bosher, Jr., Superintendent, Henrico County Public Schools, to Smith (Oct. 9, 1991),
reprinted in 18 IDELR 469 (1991); Letter from Robert R. Davlia, Assistant Secretary,
Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, to Joseph R. Symkowick,
General Counsel, California State Department of Education (Jan. 30, 1991), reprinted
in 17 EHLR 469 (1991).
175. Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 559-61 (4th Cir. 1997).
176. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Provision of Special-education Services During an
Expulsion: Commonwealth of Virginia v. Riley, 118 EDUC. L. REP. 557 (1997) (dis-
cussing early litigation and providing a comprehensive treatment of the Common-
wealth of Virginia v. Riley litigation).
177. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), affg sub nom. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470
(9th Cir. 1986).
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or her current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to
the student or others.'78 In making this determination, the hearing
officer must consider whether the school district has made reasona-
ble efforts to minimize the risk in the student's current
placement. 179
According to a ruling by an Alabama district court in Gadsden
City Board of Education v. B.P.,180 the 1997 amendments to the
IDEA allow a school district to seek an injunction from a hearing
officer but do not require this to be done prior to seeking a court
order.' 8 ' According to the court, the expedited hearing provision
is permissive, and administrative remedies do not have to be ex-
hausted if a school district chooses to seek a Honig injunction from
the courts.' 82
E. Short Term Suspensions
The 1997 amendments also gave schools the authority to suspend
a special-education student for up to ten days as long as a similar
sanction would be applied to students who are not disabled.183
However, a functional behavioral assessment must be made first
and action must be taken to address the student's misconduct. 184
The IDEA's regulations state that a series of removals which cu-
mulatively equal more than ten school days may be considered a
change in placement.' 85 The length of each removal, the total
amount of time the student is removed, and the proximity of the
removals to one another are all factors that will be considered in
determining if a change in placement occurred. 86
F. Transfers to Other Settings for Disciplinary Reasons
As will be discussed later, the IDEA allows schools to place stu-
dents with disabilities who have committed drug and weapons vio-
lations in an interim alternative educational setting.1 87 However,
school officials may also seek to place students they consider dan-
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2) (2001). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.521 (1999) (imple-
menting regulations regarding the authority of hearing officers).
179. 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(c) (1999).
180. Gadsden City Bd. of Educ. v. B.P., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
181. Id. at 1300.
182. Id. at 1303.
183. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(i) (2001).
184. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i).
185. 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(a) (1999).
186. Id. § 300.519(b).
187. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
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gerous in a permanent alternative educational setting. If the par-
ents disagree with the recommended change in placement, school
personnel may seek an expedited hearing to make the transfer.
In Randy v. Texas City ISD,188 school officials recommended that
a special-education student who, in consort with another student,
ripped the pants off a female student, be transferred to an alterna-
tive education program for the remainder of the school year.' 89
Prior to making this recommendation, the IEP team determined
that this act of misconduct was not a manifestation of the student's
disability. 190 The student's parents sought a court injunction to
prevent the transfer. 191 In denying the injunction the court stated
that the disciplinary response by the school district was entirely ap-
propriate given the facts of the case. 192 The court felt that school
officials were "justified in taking stern and aggressive remedial ac-
tion when faced with such conduct.' '1 93
G. Rights of Students Not Yet Identified as Disabled
The enactment of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA has settled
the controversy over the treatment of students who have not yet
been identified as being disabled but who allege disabilities. The
amendments mandate that a school district must provide the
IDEA's protections to such a student if school officials knew the
student was disabled before the misbehavior occurred.194 The
amendments also specify the circumstances under which school dis-
trict personnel shall be deemed to have such knowledge. 195 Factors
such as a parent's written expressed concern that the student may
require special-education or a request for an evaluation; the stu-
dent's prior behavioral and academic performance; and a teacher's
expressed concern about the student's performance are all indica-
tors that school officials had reason to know that the student was
disabled.196 If the school district has conducted an evaluation and
determined the student does not have a disability then the district
188. Randy v. Tex. City ISD, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Tex. 2000).




193. Id. at 1311.
194. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(A) (2001). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.527 (1999) (imple-
menting regulations).
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B) (2001).
196. Id. § 1415(k)(8)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b) (1999).
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would not be considered to have knowledge of a disability under
this section. 197
If the school district did not have prior knowledge that the stu-
dent was disabled, the student may be disciplined in the same man-
ner as a non-disabled student. 198 However, any request for an
evaluation during a time period in which disciplinary sanctions
have been imposed must be conducted in a expedited manner. 199
In an interesting case, Colvin v. Lowndes County"' the federal
district court held that parents had not shown that the student was
a child with a disability even though they had requested an evalua-
tion." ' However, the court stated that the school violated the
IDEA by failing to provide some assessment procedure to deter-
mine whether the student was disabled. 2  In contrast, a Connecti-
cut district court, in J. C. v. Regional School District,"3 found that a
student whose parents had expressed concern over his poor per-
formance and requested evaluations was entitled to the protections
of the IDEA when faced with expulsion.0 4 While the student had
been evaluated and determined not to be disabled, when he faced
expulsion he was evaluated again at his parents' request.2 0 5 This
time the school district determined that the student was eligible for
special-education. 6
H. Effect on the Juvenile Court and Law
Enforcement Authorities
As amended, the IDEA states that it should not be interpreted
to prohibit school officials from reporting a crime committed by a
special-education student to the proper authorities or to allow
them to impede law enforcement and judicial authorities from car-
rying out their responsibilities. 7 Furthermore, if school officials
do report a crime, the amendments provide that they must furnish
the student's special-education and disciplinary records to the ap-
propriate authorities. 8
197. 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(c)(1)(i) (1999).
198. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(C)(i) (2001).
199. Id. § 1415(k)(8)(C)(ii).
200. Colvin v. Lowndes County, 114 F. Supp. 2d 504 (N.D. Miss. 1999).
201. Id. at 509.
202. Id. at 510.
203. J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Conn. 2000).
204. Id. at 301.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(A) (2001); 34 C.F.R. § 300.529 (1999).
208. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (2001).
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I. Guns, Alcohol, and Drugs
School officials now have the explicit authority to transfer a stu-
dent with a disability to an appropriate interim alternative place-
ment for up to forty-five days for possession of a weapon or the
possession, use, sale, or solicitation of illegal drugs on school prop-
erty or at a school function.0 9 This clause expands the authority
previously granted to school officials by the Gun-Free Schools Act
of 1994210 to exclude students from mainstream public schools for
drug violations. The 1997 amendments to the IDEA also provided
definitions of weapons and illegal drugs by referencing other fed-
eral legislation.211 In this regard the definition of a dangerous
weapon is expanded beyond the previous definition enunciated in
the Gun-Free Schools Act. Under the new definition a dangerous
weapon includes other instruments capable of inflicting harm but
does not include small pocket knives. 12
J. Interim Alternative Settings
Under the new amendments, school districts are required to con-
duct a functional behavioral assessment and implement a behav-
ioral intervention plan for any student placed in an interim
alternative setting.213 If a parent disagrees with the placement in
the interim alternative placement and requests a hearing, the stu-
dent is to remain in the interim alternative educational setting
pending the decision of the hearing officer or until the expiration
of the forty-five day period.214 However, after the expiration of the
forty-five day period the student is entitled to return to his or her
former placement even if a hearing regarding a school district pro-
posal to change the student's placement is pending. 15
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Unfortunately all students, including those with disabilities,
sometimes misbehave and require discipline. Under the IDEA, as
it has been amended, students with disabilities are subject to the
209. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (11) (2001). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (1999) (imple-
menting regulations).
210. 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2001).
211. Id. § 1415(k)(10)(A), (B), (D); see also Controlled Substances Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 930(g)(2) (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2001).
212. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(10)(B) (2001).
213. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(B)(i).
214. Id. § 1415(k)(7)(A).
215. Id. § 1415(k)(7)(B).
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disciplinary process; however, because they are entitled to a FAPE
under that act, additional due process may be required if the disci-
plinary action could result in a substantial loss of educational
opportunity.
Schools may suspend students with disabilities for up to ten
school days by following the usual procedures. Other normal mi-
nor disciplinary sanctions, such as detentions or time-outs, may
also be imposed without resort to the IDEA's procedures. How-
ever, when the sanction may involve an expulsion or a transfer to
another educational setting, such as an alternative school, the
IDEA's protections are implicated.
School officials must first determine if the misconduct was a
manifestation of the student's disability. If it was, the student can-
not be expelled. This decision must be made within ten school days
of any decision to change a student's placement and must be made
by the school's IEP team. The IDEA states that other qualified
individuals may be included in making this decision. This allows
school administrators who were not part of the original IEP team
to participate in making the manifestation determination. In mak-
ing the manifestation decision, school personnel must determine if
the nature of the student's disability is such that it either impaired
the student's ability to understand the impact and consequences of
the behavior, or it impaired the student's ability to control the be-
havior. If the IEP team determines that the misconduct was not a
manifestation of the student's disability, the student may be ex-
pelled. However, during the expulsion period the student must be
provided with special-education services. If the misconduct was
not a manifestation of the student's disability, the student cannot
be expelled. The IEP team could, however, propose a new place-
ment if it is determined that the current placement is not meeting
the student's needs. If the parents disagree with the manifestation
determination, they may contest it via the IDEA's administrative
due process mechanism.
The IDEA does permit the emergency removal of dangerous
students with disabilities regardless of whether the misconduct
stems from their disabilities. If the student is charged with the pos-
session of a weapon or drugs on school property, the student may
immediately be removed for ten school days by following the nor-
mal suspension procedure. The student may then be placed in an
interim alternative placement for a forty-five day period. This al-
ternative placement must allow the student to progress in the gen-
536
DISCIPLINE UNDER IDEA
eral education curriculum and must be one in which the student's
special-education services can be delivered.
In situations not involving drugs or weapons but that neverthe-
less cause school officials to feel the student's continued presence
in the school would cause a danger to others or could substantially
interrupt the education process, relief may be obtained via a judi-
cial or hearing officer order. However, in order to obtain an in-
junction to prevent a student from attending his or her former
educational program, school officials must show they have done all
they could to mitigate the danger or chance of disruption and that
there is no less restrictive alternative.
School districts are also required to conduct a functional behav-
ioral assessment and develop a behavior intervention plan at cer-
tain junctures in the disciplinary process. School personnel would
be prudent to include these as part of the annual IEP process for
all students with disabilities who have a history of misbehavior.
Neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations specify what
elements should be included in a functional behavioral assessment.
However, it should include elements such as observations of the
student that document aspects of his or her behavior; analysis of
the situations that trigger misbehavior; analysis of the effectiveness
of previous interventions; medical, psychological, and social data
that could affect behavior; and any other information that could
provide insight into the student's behavior.
Similarly, the IDEA and its implementing regulations provide
little guidance as to what elements should be included in a behav-
ior intervention plan. Obviously, the plan should include strategies
for dealing with the student's behavior. This would include both
strategies for dealing with the behavior at the time it surfaces as
well as long-term strategies for preventing future occurrences. The
plan should also include supports that will be provided to the stu-
dent to help him or her deal with the situations that tend to precipi-
tate the behavior. Finally the plan should outline expected
behaviors, delineate inappropriate behaviors, and specify the posi-
tive and negative consequences for any behavior.
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions on students with disabil-
ities has been one of the more controversial aspects of the IDEA.
It is a difficult issue because it counters the ever-present duty of
school administrators to maintain order, discipline, and a safe edu-
cational environment balanced against the rights students with dis-
abilities have to a free appropriate public education in the least
restrictive environment. The current provisions of the IDEA,
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along with the case law that exists, strike an appropriate balance.
School officials may take disciplinary action against a student with
disabilities. However, to do so they must follow the IDEA's proce-
dures. This allows misbehaving students to be disciplined but also
removes the possibility that they will be deprived of educational
opportunities for behavior that stems from their disabilities.
